Challenger Disaster: The Challenger tragedy was as much a failure of decision-making as of technology.

The Challenger tragedy was as much a failure of decision-making as of technology. The determination to launch was made under so much emotional pressure that standard measures of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration were avoided, and the objections of specialists and engineers were either overruled or kept from main decision-makers. The pressures on NASA were forceful and diverse. They included the need to lock Congressional financial support through demonstrations of cost-effectiveness and efficiency, the …

…the laws of psychology that should not be ignored. They should be carefully considered in designing all critical decision-making systems. Works Cited Cheng, Cliff, ed. James W. Messerschmidt: Managing to Kill. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996. Clayton, Brenda. Personal Interview. 19 Oct. 2003. Linddorff, Dave. "When all systems aren't go; engineers' duty to speak out." The Nation. 28 June 1986: 880-883. Wellborn, Stanley N. "A year later, a space agency still racked." U.S. News & World Report. 2 Feb. 1987: 64-65.